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THE METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF PLATO AND BERGSON 
MARK C. TIMMONS 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
Striking similarities in certain aspects of the doctrines of Plato 
and Bergson support the claim that, for both, intuition is the sole 
method of apprehending the ultimate object of epistemological cer-
tainty. 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the historically recurrent problems in philosophy 
concerns the idea of the Real: What is the Real and by what 
means (if any) can it be known? These fundamental meta-
physical and epistemological questions have assumed central 
importance throughout the writings of most philosophers but 
are treated with especial brilliance and novelty in the philo-
sophies of Plato and Bergson. For Plato, knowledge of the 
Real consists in the dialectical movement along the ''upward 
path" from the world of appearances to the world of the 
immutable, unchanging Forms. Bergson, on the other hand, 
argues that the Real is pure duration, a heterogeneous, qualita-
tive multiplicity that can be known only through an intel-
lectual conversion whereby one gains an intuitive understand-
ing of the Real. Although Plato and Bergson disagree as to the 
nature of the Real, there is a striking resemblance in meth-
0dology that both men advocate. This similarity in meth-
odology is not historically interesting, but may well serve as 
a stepping stone in the unraveling of a supposed ambiguity 
within the Platonic Corpus. Whereas Bergson is quite explicit 
in setting forth a theory of philosophical method,Plato treats 
the issue in a rather cursory manner at various places in the 
Dialogues. Consequently, many interpretations have been put 
forth in an attempt to render consiste!1t the various passages 
throughout Plato's works. But striking similarities in certain 
aspects of the doctrines of Plato and Bergson suggest an inter-
pretation of Plato that does justice to the various relevant 
passages scattered throughout the Dialogues. Thus, I shall 
first make some general remarks about the methodologies 
of Bergson and Plato in order to set the stage for the compari-
son that I hope will shed light on Plato's method. Of course, 
in undertaking such a task, one must proceed in a vigilant 
manner, being careful not to force the thought of one philo-
sopher into the Procrustean Bed of another. We must, in Berg-
son's words, "grasp the thought of a philosopher for what it 
really is" (1946:108). 
I 
Bergson, as is well known, distinguishes two profoundly 
different ways of knowing a thing: the way of analysis and the 
way of intuition. Analysis is the understanding of a thing 
through what it is not. It expresses the nature of an object 
in terms of other objects that are already taken to be known. 
It uses universal concepts only, and, therefore, by this method 
one can know of an object only by what it has in common 
with other objects, never by what is unique in it. Any object 
is more than a meeting place of a number of universals; but 
this addition that explains the meeting of them is precisely 
what conceptual methods cannot capture. Intuition, on the 
other hand, is an intellectual sympathy, acquired by no little 
effort, whereby one is projected into the object and identi-
fied with its being. It puts one in possession of some abso-
lute,not as a point upon which universals are seen to converge, 
but as a point from which they are seen to radiate. 
Thus, it appears that analysis and intuition are directly 
opposed to one another. Yet, in the life of knowledge, there 
is an organic bond between the two by virtue of which the one 
process pays into the other. Hence, the function of intui-
tion can be best understood as a process complementary to 
analysis. In other words, the richness and the significance of 
an intuition is dependent upon the amount of analysis pre-
ceding it. An intuition gained by merely abandoning the work 
of concept-forming and concept-weaving is an unintelligible 
blur into which nothing has gone and from which nothing can 
emerge. To take one of Bergson's examples: one may read the 
adventures of a hero with a readiness of sympathy hardly to 
be distinguished from an ill-balanced sentimentality, or one 
may keep alert one's powers of criticism and analysis, studying 
the character from different angles and, fmally, fusing those 
judgments in a way that puts one in a ready disposition to 
enter sympathetically into the character of the hero. The first 
would be an intuition that had ignored or rejected the work 
of analysis; the second, one that would have meaning because 
it builds upon and supplements that undertaking. 
like Bergson, Plato holds that knowledge of the abso-
lute or Real is possible, but possible only if one is willing to 
employ a particular method. The particular method that Plato 
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discusses and recommends is called by him ''the dialectical 
method" or "the power of conversing." Although Plato speaks 
of this method in various dialogues, the precise nature of the 
Dialectic is nowhere explicitly formulated. And while the 
Phaedo and the Republic provide the best source of examina-
tion in an attempt to understand Plato's methodology, many 
critics have found incongruities between the two texts. 
In the Phaedo, Plato formulates a methodological 
principle that would enable one, by careful use of reasoning, 
to attain clear insight into the nature of all things. This "me-
thod of hypothesis," as it is called, involves the following 
features: (1) It is an hypothesizing in which one adopts 
opinions deliberately-he does not slide into them uncon-
sciously; (2) It is a procedure in which one explores implica-
tions-drawing out the consequences of hypotheses-and 
carefully distinguishes premises from conclusions; (3) It is a 
method that consists in paying the utmost attention to the 
avoidance of contradiction, in rejecting any set of opinions 
that is self-contradictory; and, fmally; (4) The hypothetical 
method consists in holding one's opinion provisionally, never 
dogmatically. 
The method of hypothesis, therefore, seems to suggest 
a procedure of graduated approximation, whereby altera-
tions are perpetually made in one's whole web of opinions as 
contradictions are revealed among them. In this manner, the 
inquiring mind renders these opinions more and more ade-
quate. But it does not appear that they are ever rendered 
fmal; the possibility that another contradiction will tum up 
is always present. This method seems to provide no way of 
converting the provisional into the certain. 
The topic of methodology is again treated in the Re-
public, especially in connection with the Divided line and the 
Cave. And while much of the discussion in these passages is 
consistent with the hypothetical method of the Phaedo, 
Plato makes an addition: he now proposes that by means of 
this tentative and hypothetical attack, one may reach absolute 
certainty. It is not a matter of perpetual improvement and 
approximation as in the Phaedo, but of attaining incorrigi-
ble truth. Plato declares that a proper method, while recogniz-
ing hypotheses for what they are, can so manipulate them as 
to reach indubitable truth or the ''unhypothesized beginning." 
Thus, in the Republic, Plato advocates a passage from 
hypothesis to an unhypothesized beginning by way of an 
''upward path." The dialectical method alone proceeds in this 
upward manner, destroying inadequate hypotheses in the 
movement toward the Real. Now, while the upward path 
includes the hypothetical method of the Phaedo, it does not 
seem to exhaust the dialectic as Plato conceived it in the 
Republic because it does not give the infallible certainty or 
sure grasp of an ''unhypothesized beginning" that is empha-
sized in the Republic. The characteristic and new element 
in the Republic is the claim to have a method that gives abso-
lute certainty. The question to be raised here is: What method 
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has Plato determined in the Republic, in addition to the hy~ 
thetical method of the Phaedo, by which he thinks the dia'il 
lectician can escape from the tentativeness of the Phaedo's' 
procedure and reach indubitable certainty? In order to answer 
this question, I want to explore the methodologies of both 
Plato and Bergson, hoping that the suggestiveness of this 
comparison will secure an answer. 
II 
It should be clear from what has been said that the 
philosophical methods of Plato and Bergson admit of com-
parison. Above, I claimed that analysis and intuition are 
intimately bound up with each other, such that analysis serves 
as a mental preparation for an intellectual conversion. Again, 
I held that while the hypothetical method of the Phaedo is 
incorporated into the dialectic, Plato argues that this latter 
method can lead one to absolute knowledge of the Real,· 
whereas the former cannot. Thus, for both men, the Real is 
capable of being grasped intellectually by means of a special 
method. In this section I want to argue that for Plato, knowl-
edge of the Real is to be attained by intuition, a method 
similar to the intellectual sympathy that Bergson repeat-
edly emphasizes. Thus, I shall proceed by carefully tracing 
Plato's theory of dialectic, making the appropriate connec-
tions to Bergson's thought. 
The upward path of the Republic includes, then, the 
hypothetical method of the Phaedo, yet there seems to be an 
added element. Whereas the hypothetical method only secures 
tentative certainty, the dialectic arrives at absolute certainty. 
It is true that in the line, Plato is pointing to a contrast of 
intellectual temperaments, and that the scientific habit of 
reasoning from unquestioned assumptions does differ from the 
philosophical readiness and ability to extend indefmitely the 
analysis of the presuppositions either of science or common 
sense; but it is false that this is all he is doing. Bergson seems 
to be in complete agreement with this when he discusses 
the contrast between science and philosophy. Science, for 
Bergson, uses symbols and proceeds by reducing objects to 
elements already known. Philosophy, on the other hand, must 
go beyond all concepts in order to grasp what is real. So long 
as one is confmed to the realm of concepts, all knowledge is 
relative. Only a transcending of this scientific framework 
will yield knowledge of the absolute. 
Plato seems to be arguing in a similar fashion. Science, 
for Plato, utilizes the hypothetical method. In the same way 
in which analysis for Bergson will never lead one to the Real, 
so for Plato, science proceeds by drawing consequences from 
hypotheses in an attempt to reach a more adequate hypo-
thesis. But such a method cannot go beyond any ''hypothe-
tical beginning": no absolute knowledge is capable of being 
revealed. 
It has already been noted that Bergson advocates a' 
"going beyond" all conceptual analysis, a complete dispensing 
with the symbols ordinarily used in everyday thought. Plato's 
theory of the tine conveys a similar outlook and can be inter-
preted as a method for "going beyond" the methods of science 
to grasp the absolute or what is unquestionable. 
Another comparison will bring my point clearly into 
focus. In the first section of this paper, I was particularly 
concerned to stress the relationship between analysis and 
intuition, and I argued that the appropriate amount and kind 
of analysis may put one in a disposition to make the mental 
effort of intuition. Similarly, in the Republic Plato seems to 
be claiming that the man who competently and conscienti-
ously practices this hypothetical method may one day find 
himself in the possession of an unhypothesized beginning. 
This fmal stage of cognizing the ''unhypothesized'' is not a 
proof; no demonstration is made of the absolute at all. Soc-
rates speaks in terms of "proceeding" to a beginning, but this 
is not to say that one proves what is grasped absolutely. 
The "beginning" at which dialectic arrives is the Form of the 
Good; and Plato's view seems to be that the Good, far from 
being proved, is the presupposition of all proof that is not 
hypothetical. In the way in which the Real for Bergson is 
known through intuition, so for Plato; it seems reasonable to 
interpret him as saying essentially the same thing: Knowledge 
of the Good involves an intuition, a going beyond all analysis, 
a dispensing with hypotheses. Of course, for Plato, the process 
of the upward path is necessary for knowledge of the Good, 
though it is not sufficient. 
If my interpretation of Bergson set forth at the begin-
ning of this paper is essentially correct, then it is clearly rea-
sonable to make a comparison between the relationships of 
analysis and intuition on the one hand, and of progression 
along the upward path and knowledge of the Good on the 
other. But one may question whether Plato should be held 
to an ''intuition'' theory of the upward path. Perhaps I have 
made use of the Procrustean Bed in my comparison of Plato 
and Bergson. Yet, I think other passages throughout the 
Dialogues may secure my claims concerning the dialectic 
so far. 
If the upward path, like analysis, does not prove or lead 
one automatically to knowledge of the Real, of what use is 
it? In lieu of proceeding up this challenging path, why not 
begin at the beginning itself? The reason lies in what I take 
Bergson to be saying concerning analysis and intuition. I 
mentioned that intuition without analysis would be like some-
one naively sympathizing with the character of a novel where 
the intellectual sympathy involved could hardly be distin-
guished from ill-balanced sentimentality. In a similar manner, 
the prisoner released from the Cave goes through a series of 
objects graduated in brightness before he can look at the sun. 
This series of preliminary objects does not demonstrate the 
sun, but only enables him to see it. The prisoner gradually 
strenghtens his eyes. Just so, the dialectician on the upward 
path is gradually strengthening his mental vision until he 
can fully comprehend the existence of each stage. Without 
progressing along this series of objects graduated in bright-
ness, one would be blinded and overcome by gazing at the sun, 
not unlike the person who naively enters into the character 
of the novel. 
In "Philosophical Intuition," Bergson speaks of intui-
tion as a negative process in which one rejects a certain idea 
as being simply impossible: 
What a strange force this intuitive power of 
negation is! ... Is it not obvious that the first 
step the philosopher takes when his thought is 
still faltering and there is nothing definite in his 
doctrine, is to reject certain things defmitely? 
Later he will make changes in much of what he 
affirms, but he will vary only slightly in what he 
believes (1946: 105). 
Again, it seems that this negative aspect of intuition 
parallels one's progression up the tine. At each successive 
stage of the line, one is greatly inclined to accept the appear-
ances and take them to be Real. But it is the whispering of 
the word "Impossible!" into the philosopher's ear that com-
pels him to reject as Real what each stage offers, "even though 
the facts and reasons appeared to invite you to think it possi-
ble and real and certain" (1946:110). Thus, as one moves 
up the tine, the hypotheses that present themselves are 
continually being altered and refined, rejected for what is 
more adequate. 
Let us tum now to other Dialogues for support of my 
interpretation, which at this point may seem to rest on tenu-
ous evidence. In the Symposium, Plato gives an account of 
the lover's progress to the Beautiful. Although the Beautiful 
is known through itself, a long apprenticeship among the many 
beautifuls is necessary before this direct knowledge can 
occur. A similar view is implied in the Seventh Letter. Plato 
says that: 
It cannot be expressed like other learning, 
but after community of life with much discussion 
of the matter itself, it suddenly appears in the 
soul like light kindling from leaping fire, and 
thenceforth sustains itself (341 c). 
This is perhaps the clearest passage that lends credi-
bility to my claims. Here, Plato, like Bergson, is saying that 
knowledge of what is Real is not to be gained in the way one 
approaches the sciences. Rather, one must go beyond all 
science and its methods to gain an intuition whereby the 
Real "suddenly appears in the soul." This "suddenness" 
suggests an immediacy, a dispensing with one's ordinary man-
ner of symbolism, and an "entering into" or sympathizing 
intellectually with the Absolute. 
Both in the Republic and the Seventh Letter, Plato 
seems to attribute the same quality of ineffability to one's 
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apprehension of the Good that can be found in Bergson's 
claims concerning the intuition of duration. For Bergson, 
one's experience of pure duration is essentially incommuni-
cable! 
... that which constitutes his [the char-
acter's] essence cannot be perceived from without, 
being internal by definition, nor be expressed in 
symbols, being incommensurate with everything 
else (1946:108). 
In Plato this same inexpressability of one's intuition of 
the Real is mentioned in the Republic. When Glaucon asks 
Socrates to tell him what the Good is, Socrates replies: 
I am afraid it is beyond my powers; with the 
best will in the world I should only disgrace my-
self and be laughed at (506E). 
Again in the Seventh Letter Plato, in talking about 
knowledge of the Good, writes: 
But when it is "the fifth" about which we 
are compelled to answer questions or to make 
explanations, then anyone who wishes to refute 
us has the advantage and can make the propounder 
of a doctrine, whether in writing or speaking or 
in answering questions, seem to most of his 
listeners completely ignorant. . . . Those who 
listen sometimes do not realize that it is not the 
mind of the speaker or writer which is being re-
futed, but these four instruments mentioned. 
(343E). 
The reservations that Plato expresses in both passages 
concerning the communicating of the Good stems from the 
fact that since the knowledge to be gained of the Good is in-
expressible, any attempt to convey such knowledge is hope-
lessly obscure, if not silly. 
In talking of "intuition," Bergson describes this ex-
perience as an "entering into" the object in order to under-
stand what is unique in it. I think Plato has a similar point 
in mind in his repeated assertion that there must be a kinship 
between the mind of the enquirer and the ultimate objects 
of philosophical study. For example, in the Seventh Letter, 
Plato says: 
In short, neither quickness of learning nor 
a good memory can make a man see when his 
nature is not akin to the object (344A). 
Both men appear to be saying that intuition involves 
an immediacy that no amount of analysis or scientific 
research or method of demonstration can attain. 
There is a fmal comparison I want to sketch con-
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cerning Plato's conception of the downward path and Berg-
son's notion of moving from intuition to analysis. In ''Philo-
sophical Intuition ," Bergson claims that as one seeks to pene. 
trate more fully into a philosopher's thought instead of 
"moving around its exterior," his doctrines are transformed 
for us. In other words, by grasping what is essential to the 
thought of another via intuition, the whole of his thOUght 
is brought together "into a single point." The various as· 
pects fit neatly together as the multifarious facets of the 
philosophy appear with new clarity and freshness. This is 
an example of a movement from intuition to analysis. A simi· 
lar concept is to be found in the downward path that moves 
from one's grasping of the Good to the various lesser levels. 
Having knowledge of the Good, one possesses for the first 
time categorical, demonstrative knowledge. The downward 
path distinguishes the true from false hypotheses of the up-
ward in a process that includes assimilating what is true and 
approaching it from an indubitable, unhypothesized stand· 
point. 
To conclude, there are, no doubt, many more compari-
sons to be made here, but they will be left untreated in this 
paper. Of course, the reader should not be persuaded that 
everything that Plato and Bergson say on this issue coincide 
perfectly. My purpose is to elucidate those points of coinci-
dence that I think useful in coming to a correct interpretation 
of Plato's dialectic. 
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